Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1990

State of Utah v. Patrick Dean Coando : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dixon D. Hindley; Attorney for Appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam, Sandra Sjogren; Attorneys for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, State v. Coando, No. 900019.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2833

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

POCUM~NT
KFU
45.9
.S9
DOCKET NO.

-—•*••-. wv/uni
BRIEF

9600/9
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No. 900019

vs.
PATRICK DEAN COANDO,
Defendant/Petitioner.

Category 14

REPLY OF PETITIONER
Writ of Certiorari to review opinion of the
Court of Appeals affirming the the Order of
the Eighth District Court.

Dixon D. Hindley, #3932
Attorney for Petitioner
P. 0. Box 520122
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152

R. Paul Van Dam
Attorney General
Sandra L. Sjogren
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
236 State Capitol
SALT Lake City, Utah 84114

AUG Z 0 W W

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 900019

PATRICK DEAN COANDO,
Defendant/Petitioner.

Category 14

REPLY OF PETITIONER
Writ of Certiorari to review opinion of the
Court of Appeals affirming the the Order of
the Eighth District Court.

Dixon D. Hindleyf #3932
Attorney for Petitioner
P. 0. Box 520122
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152

R. Paul Van Dam
Attorney General
Sandra L. Sjogren
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
236 State Capitol
SALT Lake City, Utah 84114

Table of Contents
Pa^e
Table of Authorities
Reply

Table of Authorities

Jonas v, Giles, 741 P. 2d 24 (C. A. Wash., 1984)
People v. Smith, 638 P. 2d 1,6 (Colo., 1981)
State in re N. H. B., 777 P. 2d 487 (Ut. Apb.,1989)
State v. Lane, 771 P. 2d 1150 (Wash., 1989)|
West Capitol Federal Savings and Loan Ass f n,558 F. 2d
(C. A. Kansas, 1977)
Young v. Hunt, 507 F. Supp. 785 (D. C , Ind., 1981)

ii

REPLY
Point 1.

The facts in State v. Lane, 771 P. 2d 1150 (Wash.,1989)

are distinguishable from the facts in the instant case.

In State

v. Lane, supra., the conduct which occurred in Washington and
formed the basis for that state's jurisdiction was mental conduct
known as premeditation.

Premeditation is an element of the crime

of first degree murder and it is an element which refers to the
conduct of the accused, not to the conduct of someone else. This
case shows only that some criminal conduct of the accused which
conduct is an essential element of the crime charged must occur
within the state in order for the state to claim jurisdiction
and nothing more.

The facts do not include the discretionary

non-proscribed act of a third party as do the facts in the instant case.
Point 2.

The case is inapposite here.

Whether the bank exercises its dicretion to pay a draft

or whether it does not exercise its discretion to pay a draft
does not necessarily depend on any prior arrangement with the
maker as respondents brief implies.
Point 3.

Due process requires that notice or process by which

parties are brought within the jurisdiction of the court which
will render judgement.

The Utah criminal jurisdiction statute

gives notice that one who commits conduct within this state
which is proscribed or the result of which is proscribed may
be subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the court.

It does

not give notice that the non-proscribed conduct of a third
party (not the accused) may subject one to the criminal jurisdiction of the court such as where a bank refuses to pay a draft

1

written by the accused.

Where a court wrongfully extends juris-

diction beyond the scope of its authority its judgement violates
due process and is void.

Furthermore to base criminal juris-

diction on the act of a third party not controlled by the accused
would be an arbitray and capricious act of the government in
2
violation of the guarantee of equal protection.
The Constitutions of the state and of the United States both
protect individuals from deprivation of their liberty without due
process of law.
liberty.

Petitioners sentence below deprived him of his

Therefore the court should consider the constitutional

issues raised even if raised for the first time on appeal.
Point 4.

The state's last arguement is in error.

Section 1

of the bad check statute is a separate crime from that in section
2/requires knowledge by the accusedthat a check won't be paid.
The knowledge element is absent from the section 2 crime which
allows one who writes a check whic is legally refused by the bank
to cure the default in 14 days to avoid criminal liability.

The

state can charge the section 1 crime regardless of the 14 day
cure provision in section 2 if it can show culpable knowledge
on the part of the accused that the chedk would not be paid.
1
Jones v. Giles, 741 F.2d 24 (C. A. Wash., 1984): West v. Capitol Federal Savings and loan Ass'n, 558 F. 2d 977 (C. A.Kans.,
1977) .
2
Young v. Hunt, 507 F. Supp. 785 (D. C. Ind.f 1981)
3
State in re N. H. B., 777 p. 2d 487 ( Ut. App., 1989)
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There fore the Utah statute has the same infirmity the Colorado
court found in its statute. " The actors conduct was complete
prior to the time taht the disinterested third party bank had
the complete freedom to decide whether to honor or dishonor the
insufficient check/1 People v. Smith, 638 P. 2d 1, 6 ( Colo. 1981)
Like the Colorado statute the Utah statute prevents any cure under section 1.

Once the bank dishonors the check the crime is

complete.

I

Furthermore and in contradistinction to the bad check
scenario in the case of rape the victims consent or the lack
of consent will occur or be effective concurrently with the act
of the accused and not at a different time or in a different
place.

Also the victim is the result of the proscribed conduct

and is not an independent third party.
analagous to the bad check statute.

The tape statute is not

The crime does not depend on

the arbitrary discretionary act of a third party for its
completion.

Dated this

day of August, 1990,

ZL.
Dixon D. Hindley
Attorney for Petitioner
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